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CRIMINAL LAW
Judge Chuck Miller *
Cynthia Morales**
David Glickler ***
HIS Article addresses substantive criminal law. First, the Article dis-
cusses recent and significant amendments to the Texas Penal Code by
the Texas Legislature. Most of these new amendments were effective
September 1, 1993, and no case law interpreting them has yet been delivered.
Second, this Article compiles particularly important decisions of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, delivered from October 1, 1992 to September 30,
1993, that will have a pervasive impact on the trial of criminal cases in
Texas. These cases either provide an excellent recapitulation of established
legal principles, reaffirm established case law that had come into question or
fallen into disuse, or establish new precedent. The cases are set out by topic,
in the general order in which they occur in the evolution of a criminal case.
This Article does not encompass legislative developments and case law on
criminal procedure or the legislative developments relating to the overhaul
of the Texas Penal Code and the sentencing reforms due to go into effect in
September of 1994.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN THE PENAL CODE
This portion presents recent changes in the Penal Code. There have been
numerous additions and revisions affecting the definition of and punishment
for certain crimes, which, for the purposes of this Article, have been grouped
in broad categories according to type of crime. For obvious reasons, this
Article will discuss only the more significant changes. All of the below de-
scribed changes went into effect on September 1, 1993, unless stated
otherwise.
It is also noteworthy that as the Penal Code was set to expire in 1994, the
legislature had to not only submit and pass amendments to the existing code,
but also reintroduce such portions of the "old" code that it wished to con-
tinue in existence. Whether on purpose or by oversight, some of the changes
that were made during this past legislative term, applicable to the 1993 Penal
Code, were not incorporated into the "new" Penal Code. Those provisions
that were not incorporated will therefore have a short life and only be effec-
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tive until August 31, 1994. Any such expirations applicable to the statutes
discussed below have been noted in an accompanying footnote.'
A. CRIMINAL INSTRUMENTS AND OFFENSES INVOLVING
CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS
Section 16.02 of the Texas Penal Code,2 dealing with unlawful intercep-
tion, use, or disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications, which
was set to expire on September 1, 1993, has been extended for another twelve
years. The new expiration date is September 1, 2005.
B. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
The legislature has amended section 19.03 of the code3 to add additional
situations that constitute capital murder.4 It is now a capital offense to mur-
der an individual who is under six years of age. The new language does not
state whether it is necessary that the actor be aware of the age of the child at
the time of the murder, although there is some legislative history that sug-
gests that such knowledge is a requirement under the new provision. A per-
son now commits capital murder when, while serving a prison term, he
commits murder with the intent to participate in a "combination," 5 such as
a prison gang. This amendment appears to be an attempt to respond to the
decision in Rice v. State,6 wherein the court held that the proof that a prison
gang member committed a murder to maintain and enhance his status in a
prison gang would not be sufficient to maintain a capital murder for remu-
neration conviction as such benefits were "too intangible to satisfy the remu-
neration element."' 7 Finally, the legislature made it a capital offense for a
person to commit murder while serving a sentence of life or ninety-nine
years for a "3g offense." 8
C. SEXUAL OFFENSES
The legislature added a new section to this chapter that makes it a third
degree felony for a mental health provider to engage in sexual contact or
sexually exploitive behavior with a patient or former patient. 9 Consent is
I. Special thanks is given to The Texas District and County Attorneys Association,
whose publication regarding changes in the Penal Code along with the aforementioned Penal
Laws of Texas, was extremely useful in preparing this section.
2. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
3. Id. § 19.03 (Vernon 1989).
4. Id. § 19.03(a).
5. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
6. 805 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
7. Id. at 435.
8. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The "3g
offenses" are capital murder, murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, aggra-
vated robbery, and indecency with a child. Note that murder and indecency with a child were
added during the last legislative session and went into effect on September 1, 1993.
9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.14 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (to be entitled "Sexual Ex-
ploitation by Mental Health Services Provider").
[Vol. 47
CRIMINAL LAW
not a defense under this new section. 10 Sexual conduct that is part of a
professionally recognized medical treatment, however, is a defense to this
section."I It is also a defense that the victim is no longer emotionally depen-
dent on the defendant and psychotherapy has terminated more than two
years before the date of the sexual contact or behavior.' 2 A repeat offense
under this section is a second degree felony. '3
D. CRIMINAL TRESPASS
The legislature added "the visible presence on the property of a crop
grown for human consumption" to the list of items constituting notice' 4 for
the purpose of criminal trespass.'" In other words, it is now an offense to
trespass on farmland with growing crops, even where there is no fencing,
signs, or oral or written commu.ication forbidding such entry or
remainder. ' 6
E. FRAUD
A new section was added that makes it an offense for a person to deceive
an insurer regarding a matter material to a claim or affecting the right or
amount of payment to which a person is entitled or for a person to solicit,
offer, pay, or receive a benefit regarding health care goods or services under
an insurance policy with the intent to deceive an insurer. 17 The classification
level of the offense varies according to the value of the claim and whether or
not the defendant is a health care practitioner or has prior convictions for
that same offense.18
F. MONEY LAUNDERING
An entire new chapter was added criminalizing the activity of handling
the proceeds of criminal activities 19 and will act as a companion to Texas
Penal Code Chapter 59 (Forfeitures). There are numerous defenses to this
offense, including the receipt of funds for legal fees by an attorney who did
not have actual knowledge that the funds were derived from illegal activi-
ties.20 The offense of money laundering is a felony, with the degree of offense
tied to the amount of money involved.21 Money laundering has also been
10. Id. § 21.14(c)(1).
11. Id. § 21.14(f).
12. Id. § 21.14(d).
13. This section was not made part of the 1994 Penal Code and so expires on August 31,
1994.
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
15. Id. § 30.05.
16. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994) with TEX. PE-
NAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon 1989) (unamended statute).
17. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.55 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (to be entitled "Insurance
Claim Fraud").
18. Expires August 31, 1994.
19. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., ch. 34 (to be entitled "Money Laundering").
20. Id. § 34.02(d).
21. See id. § 34.02(e).
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added to the list of offenses that may underlie an organized crime charge. 22
G. BARRATRY AND OTHER LEGAL PROFESSION RELATED OFFENSES
The legislature completely rewrote the barratry statute in this last ses-
sion.2 3 Among other things, the statute now specifically sets out prohibited
actions, including written communications to potential clients within thirty
days of the occurrence that would give rise to the claim and certain activities
by health care professionals or professional investigators. 24 The typical in-
person or telephonic solicitation type offense would now be third degree felo-
nies, while violations of the restrictions on written communications are a
Class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a third degree felony on the
second offense.
The legislature also made the unauthorized practice of law 25 and the act
of falsely holding oneself out as a lawyer 26 criminal offenses, the latter being
a third degree felony 27 and the former being a Class A misdemeanor on the
first offense and a third degree felony on the second offense.28
H. HARASSMENT
The harassment statute has been expanded to include actions commonly
known as "stalking." 29 It is now an offense for an individual, on more than
one occasion, to engage in conduct directed specifically at a person that is
likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass that person,
including following that person. 30 It is also necessary that the defendant, on
at least one occasion, has threatened to inflict bodily harm on that person,
that person's family, or that person's property and that at least one of those
occasions be after the person at whom the conduct is directed has reported
at least one incident to law enforcement authorities. 3 1 "Stalking" is a Class
A misdemeanor, unless the actor has a previous stalking conviction, in
which case, it becomes a third degree felony.32 This law went into effect on
March 19, 1993.
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
23. Id. § 38.12.
24. This revised statute is, in fact, the subject of a federal lawsuit against the State of
Texas and most of the district attorneys' offices in the state, that alleges that the new statute
violates free speech rights. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
in the case of Moore v. Morales, C.A. No. 931270, has imposed temporary orders enjoining the
State from prosecuting any violations under that statute. Trial on the merits in that case is
pending.
25. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.123 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (to be entitled "Unauthorized
Practice of Law").
26. Id. § 38.122 (to be entitled "Falsely Holding Oneself Out as a Lawyer").
27. Id. § 38.122(b).
28. Id. § 38.123(c) & (d).
29. Id. § 42.07 (Vernon 1989).
30. This will be TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
31. Id.




There were also some significant additions and revisions to a number of
provisions that are not related to a specific crime. A "hate crimes" statute
was enacted that raises the punishment for an offense, other than a first de-
gree offense, to the next highest punishment category if, during the punish-
ment phase, the court makes an affirmative finding under Article 42.014 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure33 that the victim of the crime was
selected because of the defendant's prejudice against a person or group.34
Additionally, an amendment was made to the solicitation statute that makes
it an offense to solicit a child to commit any felony.35 It is not necessary that
the felony be a first-degree felony, as is required for the solicitation of
adults. 36 The legislature also amended the requirement of a voluntary act
statute to state that a person can commit a crime by omission if there was a
duty to act under any "law," not only under a "statute. '37
II. SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW
A. PRETRIAL AREAS
In the pretrial area, cases decided last year by the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals address such issues as implied consent to a crime scene search, Faretta
admonishments, 38 defects in complaints, the State's duty to disclose evi-
dence, defense work product, a defendant's right to an appointment of a
defense expert, double jeopardy, the State's right to jury trial in a misde-
meanor case, warnings regarding consequences of the refusal of a intoxilyzer
test, release on bond under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, 39 waiver of ten days preparation time, and adequate notice that
the State would seek an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used.
1. Search and Seizure
a. Implied Consent of Owner Is Sufficient to Permit the Search of a
Crime Scene
In Brown v. State4° the Court of Criminal Appeals, for the first time, ad-
dressed the doctrine of implied consent for a search of a crime scene. 4' In
Brown the court found that where a defendant had summoned police to his
33. Article 42.014 was added to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure during the last
session. It went into effect on September 1, 1993. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014
(Vernon Supp. 1994).
34. Id. § 12.47 (to be entitled "Penalty if Offense Committed Because of Bias or
Prejudice").
35. This will be TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994). Expires
August 31, 1994.
36. To be TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994); see TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 15.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
37. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(c) (Vernon 1974).
38. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (Vernon 1989).
40. 856 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
41. Id. at 179.
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home, after reporting that he had found his wife dead in the garage and
suspected that she had been robbed, implied consent was given to the officers
to search the attached home, where they found evidence that implicated the
defendant, even though the defendant had never been asked to consent to
such a search.42 The court held when a crime is reported to the police by an
individual who
controls the premises to which the police are summoned, and that indi-
vidual either states or suggests that the crime was committed by a third
person, he or she implicitly consents to a search of the premises reason-
ably related to the routine investigation of the offense and the identifica-
tion of the perpetrator. As long as the individual is not a suspect in the
case or does nothing to revoke his consent, the police may search the
premises for these purposes, and evidence obtained thereby is
admissible. 43
However, the implied consent is valid only for the initial investigation con-
ducted at the scene and does not carry over into any future visits. 44 This
doctrine of implied consent has already been adopted by a number of states,
whose reasoning the court adopted.45
2. Statutory Warnings
a. Giving More Than Statutory Warnings May Destroy Voluntariness
Under Article 67011-5, section 2 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, 46 a
person who is suspected of driving while intoxicated must voluntarily con-
sent to submit to a breath test or none shall be taken. This section also
provides that a person arrested for this offense must be warned that if he
refuses to submit to the breath test, his driver's license will be suspended for
ninety days and evidence of his refusal will be admissible against him in
court.47 However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has now held that giving
anything more than these warnings may destroy the voluntariness of any
consent given.
The defendant in Erdman v. State48 was arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated and was asked to submit to a breath test. The deputy who arrested the
defendant, however, not only gave him the two warnings required by the
statute, but also told him that if he did not submit to the breath test, D.W.I.
charges would be filed against him and he would be placed in jail that night.
The defendant then "consented," took the test, failed, and was charged with
D.W.I. He later filed a motion to suppress the results of the intoxilyzer test,
that was overruled. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that
the additional "warnings" were of the nature that would normally result in
42. Id. at 178.
43. Id. at 182.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1994); see also Turpin v.
State, 606 S.W.2d 907, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
47. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
48. Erdman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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considerable psychological pressure on a D.W.I. suspect to consent to taking
a breath test and thus the defendant's consent had been involuntary.49 The
court held that since the defendant's results were inadmissible, the trial court
had abused its discretion in refusing to suppress the results. 50
The concurring opinion in Erdman expounded on the appellate standard
to be applied, stating that voluntariness was a mixed question of law and fact
and that at trial the State was required to prove voluntariness by clear and
convincing evidence.51 On appeal, the decision of the trial court to admit or
refuse to admit the evidence would not be reversed unless it could be shown
that the trial court abused its discretion.5 2
3. Waiver of Rights
a. Faretta Compliance Must Appear in the Record, Even in an
Unrecorded Misdemeanor
In Faretta v. California53 the United States Supreme Court required that
in order to invoke the right of self-representation, a defendant should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 54 The
Supreme Court stated that the record must contain proper admonishments
concerning pro se representation and any necessary inquiries of the defend-
ant so that the trial court could ascertain that the defendant was making a
knowledgeable choice to represent himself.55
This "Faretta requirement" was codified into Texas law by way of Article
1.051(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 56 and, although the dic-
tates of that Article have been held not to be mandatory, 57 it is still neces-
sary that the record be sufficient for the reviewing court to make an
assessment that the defendant knowingly exercised his right to defend
himself.5 8
In Goffney v. State59 the Court of Criminal Appeals was faced with the
question of whether a statement in the judgment and sentence that the de-
fendant had "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel ' 6° and the presumption of regularity in court proceedings were suffi-
cient to meet the Faretta requirement. In holding that they were not, the
majority in Goffney noted that the issue at hand was not whether the defend-
ant had properly waived his right to counsel, but rather, whether the record
reflected that the defendant made his choice of self-representation "with his
eyes open" and whether the record contained the admonishments about the
49. Id. at 894.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 895 (Baird, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 895.
53. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
54. Id. at 835.
55. Id. at 836.
56. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
57. Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
58. Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
59. 843 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
60. Id. at 585.
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dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 6' Finding that the record
did not, the court upheld the reversal of the defendant's conviction.62
The dissent broadly hints that an express statement in the record (rather
than an implicit reflection) that the Faretta admonishments were given
would suffice, even if the record did not show the actual admonishments. 63
b. Defendant Must Affirmatively Waive Right to Ten Days
Preparation After Appointment of Counsel
Matin v. State,64 while discussing the particular issue of a waiver pursuant
to Article 1.05 1(e) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,6 5 also provides
a definitive analysis of the means by which different types of rights may be
preserved and a clarification of when a harm analysis under Rule 81 (b)(2) of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure66 is appropriate. 67
In Matin the defendant did not expressly waive his right under Article
1.051(e) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for his newly appointed
counsel to have ten days to prepare for trial, yet his case proceeded to trial
six days after the appointment. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was
entitled to the ten day preparation time and that the denial of such a right
was preserved even though he had made no objection at the trial court level.
In holding that the defendant had preserved such issue for appeal, the
Court of Criminal Appeals noted that there are three distinct kinds of
rules:68 1) absolute requirements and prohibitions, which cannot be waived
or forfeited (such as jurisdiction); 2) rights that must be implemented unless
expressly waived (such as right to counsel or right to a jury trial); and 3)
rights that are to be implemented by request (such as a preemptory challenge
or jury shuffle) and thus can be waived by procedural default under Rule
52(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 69 Applying such reasoning
to the Matin case, the court held that the ten days preparation time granted
by Article 1.051(e) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure falls into the
category of those rights that must be implemented unless they are expressly
waived. 70 Since the defendant had not expressly waived that right, the court
held that the denial of this right was properly preserved, and sustained that
ground for review. 71
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 586 (Miller, J., dissenting).
64. 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
65. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (granting an ap-
pointed counsel ten days to prepare for a proceeding, which preparation time can be waived
with the consent of the defendant in writing or on the record in open court).
66. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(2) (providing that, where there is error, an appellate court must
reverse a judgment unless it determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no
contribution to the punishment or conviction).
67. Matin, 851 S.W.2d at 282.
68. Id. at 279.
69. TEX. R. App. P. 52(a) (requiring a timely, specific objection in order for a complaint
to be preserved for appellate review).




The court also addressed the application of Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure stating that the harmless error rule that was
codified in Rule 81 (b)(2) applies only "to those trial errors concerning which
the record is likely to provide concrete date from which an appellate court
can meaningfully gauge or quantify the effect of the error."' 72 Accordingly,
the rule does not apply to those cases where "it is extremely difficult to know
whether they might have affected the outcome, or the likelihood that they
have influenced the outcome is so strong that it is not worth expending the
judicial resources necessary to evaluate the effect of the error in particular
cases," such as the possible effects of not having ten days to prepare for
trial.73
4. Charging Instruments
a. Defect in Complaint Must Be Raised Before Trial or Be Waived
The court in Aguilar v. State74 held that defects in complaints underlying
an information are no longer "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" error, but
must be raised in the trial court by way of a motion to set aside the indict-
ment or information or be waived. 75 The Aguilar court recognized that tra-
ditionally an invalid complaint resulted in the trial court not obtaining
jurisdiction over a defendant, but noted that the 1985 amendment of Article
5, section 12(b) of the Texas Constitution76 vests a county court with juris-
diction at the time of the filing of an information. 77 The court stated that
because of that amendment, the trial court did gain jurisdiction over the
defendant regardless of the defect in the underlying complaint and so the
defendant could not raise such error for the first time on appeal. 78 It should
be noted that the problem of a variance between a complaint and an indict-
ment, as discussed in Holland v. State,79 is still with us. However, after
Aguilar, such variance presumably will have to be raised before trial in a
motion to set aside or at a pretrial hearing.
b. Notice That State Seeking Deadly Weapon Finding
Persons accused of a crime are entitled to notice that the use of a deadly
weapon will be a fact issue if the state intends to pursue an affirmative find-
ing of the use of a deadly weapon at trial. 80 However, even a mere "allega-
tion which avers a death was caused by a named weapon or instrument
necessarily includes an allegation that the named weapon or instrument was
in the manner of its use... capable of causing death" and is sufficient notice
72. Id. at 282.
73. Id. at 281.
74. 846 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
75. Id. at 320.
76. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b).
77. Aguilar, 846 S.W.2d at 320.
78. Id.
79. 623 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
80. Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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that a deadly weapon finding is being sought."'
In Ex parte McKithan8 2 the Court of Criminal Appeals applied this rea-
soning to an involuntary manslaughter by driving while intoxicated case,
holding that the indictment, which alleged that the defendant had caused the
death of an individual by "causing the [defendant's] motor vehicle to collide
with the vehicle driven by [the deceased]," was sufficient to give notice that
the State was seeking an affirmative finding of defendant's use of a deadly
weapon. 83
c. Use of Language in a Pleading Other Than Precise Statutory Term
In Kinsey v. State 4 the court adopted the dicta in Chance v. State85 that it
is not always necessary to use the exact language of a statute in order to
charge an offense.8 6 In Kinsey, a criminal trespass case, the State pled
"owner thereof' instead of tracking the statute and pleading "of another,"
and the defendant was granted a motion to quash on this basis. In reversing
the trial court and the court of appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted
that if statutory words have a technical meaning, they cannot be replaced by
other words in a pleading.8 7 However, if words equivalent to the "common
everyday usage" of the technical term were also equivalent to the definition
of the technical term in the penal code, substitution is allowed.8 8 In Kinsey
the court found that the technical definition of "another" ("a person other
than the actor") in section 1.07 (a)(4) of the Texas Penal Code8 9 was
equivalent to the common everyday usage of the word and that "owner"
conveys the same meaning and includes the sense of the statutory word "an-
other" and so substitution of "owner" for "another" was permissible.90
5. Release on Bond Under Article 17.151 91
Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if
the State is not ready for trial within ninety days after the commencement of
detention for a felony, the defendant must be released either by reducing the
amount of bail required or on personal bond. 92
The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ex parte Rowe, 93 stated that Article
17.151 means precisely what it says - the defendant must be released. 94 The
bond must be reduced to an amount that the record indicates the defendant
81. Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
82. 838 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 561.
84. 861 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
85. 563 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
86. Kinsey, 861 S.W.2d at 384.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(4) (Vernon 1974).
90. Kinsey, 861 S.W.2d at 384.
91. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (Vernon 1989).
92. Id. art. 17.151, § 1(1).
93. 853 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
94. Id. at 582.
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can make.95 Where the record indicates that a defendant can make no bond,
then the court must release the defendant on a personal bond. 96
Further, the reason for the delay is of no moment. Article 17.151 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure contains no provisions excluding certain
periods from the statutory time limit to accommodate special, exceptional
circumstances. 97
6. State's Right to a Jury Trial
Prior to 1991, Article 1.13(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 98
provided that, in order for a defendant to waive a jury trial "for any offense
classified as a felony less than ... capital," the waiver must be in open court,
in writing, and with the consent of the State.9 9 In 1991, the legislature
amended Article 1.13(a) by removing the "felony less than capital" language
and substituting in its place "for any offense other than a capital felony...
in which the State ... seek[s] the death penalty." °
The issue in State ex rel. Curry v. Carr 10 was whether the new language
had the effect of broadening the types of cases to which the waiver require-
ments were applicable, namely, whether Article 1.13(a) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure now required the State's consent to waive a jury trial in
a misdemeanor case. In holding that it did, 10 2 the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals pointed out the change in the language and found that the trial court
had no authority to act as the fact finder in a misdemeanor case, absent the
consent and approval of the State. 10 3 The dissent vociferously protested the
extension of the State's right to force a jury trial to misdemeanor cases, argu-
ing that the legislative history did not support the majority's interpretation
of the intent of the amendment. 1 4
7. Discovery and Disclosure
a. Law Enforcement's Knowledge of Exculpatory Evidence Imputed
to Prosecutor
In Ex parte Mitchell 105 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that since the
Smith County Sheriffs Office knew of two witnesses, one who was a deputy
sheriff and one who was a game warden, who possessed information that was
exculpatory for the defendant, the State violated the defendant's rights by
not giving him that information when he made a request for exculpatory
95. Id. at 582 n.1.
96. Id. at 582.
97. Id.
98. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
99. Id. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977).
100. Id. art. 1.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
101. 847 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
102. Id. at 562. This holding applies to Class A and Class B misdemeanors only. Class C
misdemeanors are covered by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.24 (Vernon 1974).
103. Ex reL Curry, 847 S.W.2d at 562.
104. Id. at 562-67 (Miller, J. dissenting).
105. 853 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim, App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 183 (1993).
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evidence, even though the prosecutor had no knowledge of the existence of
the witnesses. 0 6
The most incriminating evidence at the defendant's trial for capital mur-
der was the testimony of two accomplices who stated that he had murdered
the victim around 8:30 p.m. The testimony of the two witnesses, who were
not made known to the defendant, would have been that they had seen a
person who might have been the victim alive several hours after 8:30 p.m.
The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it was highly probable that the
suppression of this evidence hampered defense counsel's efforts to prepare a
case that would have created a reasonable doubt that the victim could have
been alive at the time that the accomplices testified that the murder was
committed. 107
b. Discovery of Defense Work Product
In Washington v. State0 8 an investigator for defense counsel interviewed a
State's witness prior to trial and recorded the interview. At trial, defense
counsel asked the witness whether he had told the investigator something
different than he had said at trial. At this point, the trial judge, over the
defendant's objection that the tape was work-product, turned over the entire
tape of the interview to the State, which then had the tape admitted into
evidence and played to the jury.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the tape was work product be-
cause it was essentially analogous to taking notes of an interview with a
prospective witness and used to prepare the defendant's case for trial and so
was not discoverable. '0 9 The court also held that since the defendant had
never attempted to make a testimonial use of the tape, the "use before the
jury" doctrine" 10 did not apply and defendant did not waive his work-prod-
uct privilege. 1 I
The State also argued that the tape was admissible under the rule of op-
tional completeness, but the court held that the rule was not applicable in
this case because the defense never mentioned the taped conversation nor
attempted to have any portion of the tape admitted into evidence.112
c. State's Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Thomas v. State 1 3 pro-
vides an excellent recapitulation of the history of the State's duty to disclose
favorable evidence and the burden of proof and persuasion based on the
specificity of the request. The court also recounts the three-part test used to
determine when a prosecutor has violated a defendant's due process rights
106. Id. at 4-6.
107. Id. at 5.
108. 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
109. Id. at 189.
110. See Mendoza v. State, 552 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
111. Washington, 856 S.W.2d at 190.
112. Id. at 186.
113. 841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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by failing to disclose evidence. Under such test, a violation occurs when the
prosecutor 1) fails to disclose evidence; 2) that is favorable to the defendant
[as either substantive or impeachment evidence]; and 3) that creates a
probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding. 11 4 In Thomas the prosecutor failed to inform the defense about a
witness whose testimony would directly impeach the eyewitness testimony
put on by the State and the Court of Criminal Appeals found that these
actions met the requirements of the three-part test and so ordered a new
trial. 115
8. Expert Witnesses
a. An Indigent Defendant with a Viable Insanity Claim Has the Right
to a Court-Appointed Defense Expert
The Court of Criminal Appeals reexamined the rule of Ake v.
Oklahoma 16 in light of Article 46.03, section 3(a) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure" 17 in De Freece v. State. 18 In Ake the United States
Supreme Court held that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge
that insanity will be a significant factor at trial, the state must, at a mini-
mum, provide the defendant with access to a competent psychiatrist who
will conduct an examination and assist in preparation of the evaluation and
preparation of the defense.' '9 Article 46.03, section 3 provides for the ap-
pointment of a disinterested expert to examine the defendant, present a writ-
ten report, and testify at any trial or hearing on the issue.120 Traditionally,
in Texas, Ake and Article 46.03, section 3 have been interpreted to only
require the appointment of a neutral expert. 12'
The issue in De Freece was whether the defendant was entitled to have the
court appoint an expert who would be an actual member of the defense team
and assist in preparing and presenting his insanity defense at trial, rather
than merely a disinterested expert who could testify for either side. 122 In
finding that he did have this right, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated
that, despite the traditional application, Ake contained some internal contra-
dictions in requiring a single competent expert not of the defendant's choos-
ing, and, on the other hand, indicating that the defendant is entitled to an
expert who will participate with him in the case. 123 The court noted that all
114. Id. at 404.
115. Id. at 404-07.
116. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
117. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03, § 3(a) (Vernon 1989) (providing that if the
insanity defense is filed, the court may "appoint disinterested experts experienced and qualified
in mental health and mental retardation to examine the defendant with regard to the insanity
defense and to testify thereto at any trial or hearing on this issue.").
118. 848 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 284 (1993).
119. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
120. Id. art. 46.03, § 3(a) and (d).
121. Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 192 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963
(1990).
122. The court, in fact, had already appointed an expert, who had evaluated the defendant
and was scheduled to testify for the State. De Freece, 848 S.W.2d at 152.
123. Id. at 156.
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courts which have examined the Ake issue, aside from the Fifth Circuit in
Granviel v. Lynaugh, 124 have held that Ake requires more than a mere exam-
ination and testimony from a neutral expert. 125 The court then stated that
since psychiatry is not an exact science, the defendant needs a psychiatrist to
assist in his case if he is to present the fact finder with a perspective broad
enough to ensure an informed resolution of the sanity question. 126
The court concluded by holding that, if the preliminary examination pro-
vided for in Article 46.03, section 3, shows a viable insanity claim, the trial
court abuses its discretion if it fails to appoint or approve reasonable ex-
penses incurred by counsel to obtain a competent psychiatrist to assist the
defendant in the evaluation, preparation and presentation of the insanity
defense. ' 27
9. Jeopardy
a. Jeopardy and the Defectively Amended Indictment
In Ex parte Sanchez 28 the defendant was charged with the misdemeanor
offense of public lewdness at a certain theater. He pled not guilty to the
information. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to amend, which was
granted. No physical alteration of the information occurred, however, and
so, per Ward v. State,129 the information was never actually amended.
When the defendant was arraigned, the prosecutor read the "new" informa-
tion, which simply alleged the name of a different theater. It was to the
"new" information that the defendant pled not guilty. The case was contin-
ued and the State ultimately dismissed the information and refiled, alleging
the same charge that had been in the "amended" information. The defend-
ant then argued double jeopardy, asserting that since he had already pled not
guilty to the dismissed information, he could not be tried on the newly filed
information.
In reviewing the defendant's claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed
with the defendant that, in trials before a court, "jeopardy attaches when
both sides have announced ready and the defendant has pled to the charging
instrument."' 30 The court also said that since the defendant had pled to the
information that the State thought was amended to name the second theater
(although technically it was not) and both sides had announced ready, jeop-
ardy had attached to that information (which actually named the first
theater). 131
The court noted that the information had been dismissed and so could not
124. 881 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990).
125. DeFreece, 848 S.W.2d at 157.
126. Id. at 159.
127. Id.
128. 845 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
129. 829 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
130. Sanchez, 845 S.W.2d at 275 (citing State v. Torres, 805 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991)).
131. Id. at 275-76.
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be retried.' 32 The court then held that since it was undisputed that the
newly filed information related to precisely the same offense as the dismissed
information, 33 the State was precluded from litigating the allegations in the
newly filed information. 134
b. Subsequent Prosecutions - When Barred Under Grady v. Corbin 31
The Court of Criminal Appeals handed down two decisions last session
dealing with the analysis of double jeopardy issues under Grady v. Corbin,
which applied a "same conduct" test for determining whether a defendant
was placed in double jeopardy. As of June 28, 1993, Grady v. Corbin is no
longer the applicable standard.' 36 Rather, the Blockburger 3 7 "same ele-
ments" test is to be applied. The two significant cases analyzed by the Court
of Criminal Appeals under the Grady v. Corbin standard were State v.
Florio138 and Houth v. State.139
In Florio the court, citing the standards it had set out in Ex parte Ra-
mos, 4° held that since the State, in a prosection for the murder of a child,
was attempting to prove conduct (hitting a child) that constituted an offense
for which the defendant had already been prosecuted (jeopardy had at-
tached to the first trial's indictment's allegations in a paragraph alleging a
separate injury to a child), the defendant had been placed in double jeopardy
under the Grady v. Corbin test. 14'
In Houth the court held that when the State will prove previously prose-
cuted conduct (here, weaving in traffic), "but also will prove previous con-
duct in the same transaction that has not been prosecuted, to establish an
element of a subsequently charged offense" (here, driving while intoxicated),
it must rely solely on the latter conduct at trial to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of that element.142
B. TRIAL AREAS
The Court of Criminal Appeals decided several cases involving jury selec-
tion, including issues of the eligibility of jurors who require more evidence
than the legal minimum, limits on the number of jury shuffles and group bias
based peremptory strikes by the prosecution. In the area of evidence law,
132. Id. at 276 (citing State v. Proctor, 841 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) and Ex
parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
133. However, the informations did not contain the same language since, under Ward, the
dismissed information had never been amended and so still alleged lewdness at the "Star
Movie Theater," while the newly filed information alleged lewdness at the "Golden Star Movie
Theater." Sanchez, 845 S.W.2d at 274-75.
134. Id. at 276.
135. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
136. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
137. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (applying a "same elements" test).
138. 845 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
139. 845 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
140. 806 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
141. Florio, 845 S.W.2d at 853.
142. Houth, 845 S.W.2d at 864.
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the court examined the statements against interest exception to the hearsay
rule, the admissibility of enhanced duplicate recordings, confessions, im-
peachment of a witness with evidence of a conviction, bolstering testimony,
the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony, the admissibility of
unadjudicated extraneous offenses at the punishment phase of a trial and
also the admissibility of background evidence to prove certain factors. The
court also clarified when a jury instruction on mere presence is required,
stated that individual jurors may not cause questions to be asked of witnesses
and held that a judge may only answer a question from the jury during delib-
erations if the question involves a legal matter. The court also held that a
defendant in a D.W.I. trial may ask the jury not to suspend his license even
if he does not possess a license, declared who has the burden of producing
evidence that shows that a kidnap victim was released in a safe place and
stated that no body is necessary as a prerequisite to conviction in a murder
trial. In the area of punishment, the court restated the rule that any type of
incarceration is not allowed, including electronic monitoring, if the defend-
ant receives deferred adjudication, extended the rule that a defendant has an
absolute right to a punishment hearing and can preserve error by filing a
motion for a new trial, and held that deferred adjudication may be given to a
felon even if the minimum sentence for the crime is more than ten years, the
length restriction on deferred adjudication probation.
1. Jury Selection
a. Juror Who Requires More Than the Minimum Evidence Is a
Qualified Juror
A juror who would never vote yes to the future dangerousness issue if the
only evidence is the facts of the case was eligible to sit on the jury in Garrett
v. State.143 The trial judge granted the prosecution's challenge for cause in
that capital case to a venireperson who indicated that under no circumstance
could he assess the death penalty based solely on the facts of the crime itself.
The prosecution reasoned that the venireperson had a "bias or prejudice
against some aspect of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely."' 144
The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the record and found that the
venireperson did state that he would not answer both special issues affirma-
tively if the only evidence was the facts of the crime alleged. The court
stated that an individual venireperson who sets his reasonable doubt thresh-
old higher than the legal minimum is not subject to a challenge for cause. 145
Therefore, the trial judge committed reversible error by granting the prose-
cution's challenge for cause. 146 The State should have had to use a peremp-
tory strike to have the juror removed from the panel. The effect of this
decision is that in all cases, not merely capital cases, it is improper to chal-
lenge a juror for cause solely because he would require more evidence than
143. 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 860.
146. Id. at 861.
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the legal minimum. The court declared that this was so because the law
permits the facts of the crime alone to support a verdict of "yes" to the
second special issue, but does not require a jury "to answer the second spe-
cial issue affirmatively solely on the facts of that particular crime."'' 47
The court applied this holding to Wilson v. State 48 to reach the same
result in a factually indistinguishable case. In a concurring opinion, one
judge theorized that as long as the venireperson requires evidence that the
State is allowed to bring in order to answer a special issue yes, then the
venireperson was qualified to serve as a juror.' 49 Such evidence includes
prior criminal record, reputation, character, psychiatric evidence and other
evidence admissible under the rules of evidence. However, the concurring
judge reasoned that if the venireperson requires evidence the State is not
allowed to bring, or requires evidence that constitutes another crime, that
person is probably not qualified to be a juror.' 50 Evidence the State is not
allowed to bring includes testimony from the defendant and testimony that
is privileged.' 5 ' For example, if a venireperson requires that the State show
a serial killing 52 in a capital murder prosecution under section 19.03(a)(2)
of the Texas Penal Code,'5 3 then that is evidence that constitutes a different
crime. Hence, that venireperson would not be qualified to serve as a juror.
b. Only One Shuffle Allowed, Period!
The State in Chappell v. State 54 moved to shuffle the venire after the ve-
nire had been shuffled at the defendant's request. Over defendant's objec-
tion, the trial court granted the State's motion and allowed the second jury
shuffle. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that
under Article 35.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure' 55 only one
shuffle of the venire is authorized at the request of either the State or the
defendant.' 5 6 The court held that the second jury shuffle was reversible er-
ror that was not subject to a harm analysis.' 57 The court went on to clarify a
holding relied on by the State in Stark v. State"" where a defendant's re-
quest to shuffle the jury a second time was denied, and the court of criminal
147. Id. at 859.
148. 863 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
149. Id. at 70, (Miller, J. concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1994).
153. Id. § 19.03(a)(2) (capital murder involving murder during the course of committing a
felony).
154. 850 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
155. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.11 (Vernon 1989). Art. 35.11 states that "the
trial judge, on the demand of the defendant or his attorney, or of the State's counsel, shall
cause a sufficient number of jurors from which a jury may be selected to try the case to be
randomly selected from the members of the general panel drawn or assigned as jurors in the
case." Id.
156. Chappell, 850 S.W.2d at 511.
157. Id. at 513.
158. 657 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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appeals reversed. 159 The court cited the explanation in Jones v. State160 that
Stark was reversed based on improper procedures implemented by the trial
judge in shuffling the jury and not because of the denial of the defendant's
motion to shuffle.' 6' The court restated the rule in Texas that only one jury
shuffle is authorized in any case. 162
c. A Prosecutor's Group Bias Is Not a Legitimate Reason to Strike
Emerson v. State163 held that a peremptory strike by the prosecution of a
venireperson based on her occupation in the collegiate environment was not
a valid race-neutral strike and thus invalidated the entire jury selection pro-
cess. 164 The defendant was an African-American. The State used a peremp-
tory strike on an African-American venireperson because the prosecutor
believed she was a college professor or college student. The prosecutor testi-
fied in the Batson 165 hearing that he believed the venireperson's occupation
as a college teaching assistant suggested severe liberalism, a characteristic he
did not want a member of the jury to have. However, the prosecutor did not
ask any questions of the venireperson to confirm that this prospective juror
had any liberal characteristics. He further stated that he struck this juror
because she was unemployed, but the prosecutor did not strike several white
veniremen who were unemployed. The trial court ruled that the State's ex-
planations for striking the potential juror were race-neutral. The Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that the State applied a group bias without in-
quiring whether it applied to the individual venireperson and, for that rea-
son, the explanation would not support the trial judge's finding of no
purposeful discrimination. 66 The court also held that the State's explana-
tions of the strike were insufficient as a matter of law to rebut the defendant's
prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the jury selection process and
that this reason also would fail to support the trial judge's finding of no
purposeful racial discrimination. 167
2. Evidence
a. Hearsay - Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 803(24) - Statements Against
Interest: What Are They?
In McFarland v. State168 the trial court admitted statements made by the
defendant's accomplice to two individuals that implicated both men in the
rape and murder of a young woman. The Court of Criminal Appeals held
that a statement made by an accomplice after the conspiracy was over that
159. Id. at 116.
160. 833 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
161. Id. at 148-49.
162. Chappell, 850 S.W.2d at 511.
163. 851 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
164. Id. at 274-75.
165. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
166. Emerson, 851 S.W.2d at 274.
167. Id.
168. 845 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2937 (1993).
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implicates both the accomplice and the defendant is still admissible as a
statement against interest.1 69 The defendant argued against the admission of
statements made by his accomplice to civilians where the statements were
made after the crime had been completed, the body hidden, and the evidence
of the crime destroyed. The defendant argued that the statements were hear-
say and that they were admitted in violation of Texas Rule of Criminal Evi-
dence 801(e)(2)(E). 170 The Court of Criminal Appeals found that although
the statements of the accomplice were made after the conspiracy was over,
they were statements against interest and an exception to the hearsay rule. ! 7!
The court held that the statements indicated that the declarant was involved
with the defendant in some illegal act which could subject them both to
criminal liability.' 72 Rule 803(24) also requires that the statements be cor-
roborated by facts indicating the trustworthiness of the statements.17 3 The
court held that the statements made by the accomplice were corroborated by
several facts which were proven at different times. 174 These facts included
statements by the victim made just before she died, witnesses who saw the
defendant with the accomplice on the night of the crime, witnesses who saw
the defendant and his accomplice at the place where the victim worked on
the day that she was murdered, as well as other physical evidence.175 There-
fore, the court held that the statements were properly admitted by the trial
court under the statements against interest exception to the hearsay rule. 176
b. Admissibility of an Enhanced Duplicate of a Recording
In Narvaiz v. State 77 the trial court admitted an electronically-enhanced,
tape-recorded copy of a portion of all "911" telephone calls received by the
San Antonio police for the date of the crime. The state used an F.B.I. lab to
remove a "hiss" sound from a copy of the "911" tape recorded on the night
of the crime. The Court of Criminal Appeals examined the record and
found that it revealed no evidence that would support a claim that the en-
hanced duplicate recording of the original "911" reel-to-reel tape was not
authentic. The court concluded that the enhanced copy of the tape record-
ing was an accurate reproduction of the relevant portion of the original tape
and was admissible under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 1003.178 Rule
1003 only makes a duplicate inadmissible if reasonable jurors might differ as
169. Id. at 836.
170. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 801(e)(2)(E) (stating that a statement is not hearsay if it is
offered against a party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy).
171. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 803(24) (stating that a statement which tends to subject the
declarant to such criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have
made the statement unless he believed it to be true is not excluded by the hearsay rule).
172. McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 836.
173. Id. at 835.
174. Id. at 836.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 840 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1422 (1993).
178. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 1003 (allowing the admission of a duplicate unless a question is
raised as to its authenticity or it would be unfair to admit the original).
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to whether the original is what it is claimed to be. 179
c. Confessions
The question in A lmanza v. State180 was whether an oral confession would
be admissible under the limited exception to Article 38.22 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that is contained in section 3(c).18 1 The defendant had
been arrested and received his Miranda warnings and a search of his resi-
dence was being conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. The defend-
ant agreed to help the police officers locate the heroin he was accused of
selling. He pointed to the top of a dresser and indicated that what was there
was his "stuff." The police later determined this to be heroin. The trial
court admitted into evidence the defendant's statement that the wadded up
piece of paper containing the heroin was his "stuff." The Court of Criminal
Appeals ruled that the admission of the defendant's oral statement was er-
ror. 1 82 The court cited two older cases183 that had attempted to define the
standard set forth in Article 38.22, section 3(c) for what oral statements
were admissible at trial, and concluded that the facts in defendant's case did
not meet the requirements of these cases.184 The court stated that the de-
fendant's statement was little more than an admission of guilt and there was
not sufficient indicia of reliability to justify admitting the statement.18 5 The
court held that unlike the previous case law where such statements were
admissible, the defendant's statement did not lead to the discovery of evi-
dence which later verified it, and therefore the statement was not admissi-
ble.' 86 The court stated that in order for an oral confession to be admissible
as an exception to Article 38.22, it must be reliable, and this reliability is
provided not by the timing of the oral statement, but rather by the combina-
tion of the oral statement and the subsequent discovery of previously un-
known evidence that verifies the statement independently.18 7
The court affirmed this holding in Gunter v. State.18  In Gunter the trial
court admitted an oral statement made by the defendant that described the
crime in detail. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that as long as asser-
tions within the oral statement are corroborated subsequently, the entire
statement is admissible. ' 89
179. Narvaiz, 840 S.W.2d at 431.
180. 839 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
181. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Art. 38.22,
§ 3(c) allows the admission of any statement that "contains assertions of facts or circumstances
that are found to be true and which conduce to establish the guilt of the accused."
182. Almanza, 839 S.W.2d at 821.
183. Port v. State, 791 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d
539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).




188. 858 S.W.2d 430, 449 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 318 (1993).




d. Impeachment Under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 609
i. When the Court Abuses Its Discretion in Allowing Impeachment
Evidence
The issue presented in Theus v. State190 was whether a defendant's prior
felony conviction for arson should be admitted as impeachment evidence
against the defendant during the guilt stage of the trial. Texas Rule of Crim-
inal Evidence 609191 allows a prosecutor to impeach an accused with a prior
felony if the probative value of a conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.
The Court of Criminal Appeals identified five important, non-exclusive fac-
tors for the trial court to consider when making this analysis. 192 These fac-
tors are as follows: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) time
passage, (3) the similarity of the offenses, (4) the importance of the defend-
ant's testimony, and (5) the importance of the credibility issue. 193 The court
applied this analysis to the defendant's case by weighing the five factors to
determine whether the prior conviction should be admitted for impeachment
purposes. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of the arson conviction because the conviction had very
little probative value concerning the defendant's credibility. 194 The court
reasoned that discretion was abused because the arson conviction had a
highly prejudicial effect and also because the trial judge failed to allow the
defendant to mitigate the prejudice when given the opportunity to do so.195
ii. Use of Prior Probated Convictions
The admissibility of prior conviction impeachment evidence under Texas
Rule of Criminal Evidence 609(c) 196 was considered for the first time in Ex
Parte Menchaca. 197 The trial judge allowed the defendant to be impeached
with evidence of a prior conviction for which he had completed probation.
The predecessor to Rule 609(c) was Article 38.29,198 which restricted im-
peachment with a prior conviction to probations that had not expired. The
trial judge reasoned that the defendant had not "satisfactorily" completed
his probation, it had only expired. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that
there is no distinction between a probation period that is expired and one
that is satisfactorily completed, and thus the evidence of the defendant's
190. 845 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), vacated, 863 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993).
191. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 609 (requiring as a prerequisite to admitting impeachment evi-
dence against an accused that the trial court find that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect).
192. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 880.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 882.
195. Id.
196. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 609(c) (stating that evidence of a conviction is not admissible
for impeachment purposes if probation has been satisfactorily completed for the crime for
which the person was convicted and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent felony
or crime of moral turpitude).
197. 854 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
198. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.29 (Vernon 1974).
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prior felony conviction was not admissible. 199
e. Bolstering Objection Abolished; Rule 702 Expert Testimony as
Corroboration
In Cohn v. State200 a psychiatrist testified for the State about what behav-
ior would be expected from a child victim of sexual abuse and that the vic-
tims in this case behaved in a manner consistent with being abused. The
defendant's objection that the testimony was inadmissible "bolstering" of the
victims was overruled. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that "bolster-
ing" is the use of any evidence the sole purpose of which is to convince the
fact finder that a particular witness or source of evidence is worthy of credit,
without substantially contributing to make a fact of consequence to the case
more or less probable. 20 ' The court held that the psychiatrist's testimony
was relevant under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 403202 because the doc-
tor did not testify that the kids had actually been abused or that they were
telling the truth, and thus was admissible. 20 3 When evidence corroborates
testimony, it is not bolstering if it also helps establish a fact of conse-
quence. 2° 4 Also, though such substantive evidence corroborates prior testi-
mony, it should not for that reason be excluded for "unfair prejudice" if it is
otherwise admissible. 20 5
f. Admissibility of Eyewitness Expert Testimony
The controversy in Rousseau v. State20 6 began when the trial court refused
to admit the testimony of a psychologist concerning the reliability, or lack
thereof, of eyewitness identification. The defendant claimed that the testi-
mony was admissible as expert testimony under Texas Rule of Criminal Evi-
dence 702207 because it was relevant under Rule 402.208 The Court of
Criminal Appeals examined Rule 702, recognizing that the failure of an ex-
pert witness to fit his testimony to the evidence in the case reduces the likeli-
hood that the jury would be aided by the expert's testimony.20 9 The record
showed that, on voir dire, the expert witness called by the defendant failed to
"fit" his testimony to the evidence, because he had not examined any of the
eyewitnesses in the case nor did he state whether any factors he planned to
discuss would apply to any of the eyewitnesses. The court held that this
greatly reduced the likelihood that the jury would be measurably aided by
his testimony, and thus, under these facts, the trial judge did not abuse his
199. Exparte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 131.
200. 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
201. Id. at 819-20.
202. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
203. Cohn, 849 S.W.2d at 820.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 820-21.
206. 855 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 313 (1993).
207. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 702 (governing testimony by experts).
208. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 402.
209. Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 686.
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discretion in excluding the doctor's testimony.210
g. Unadjudicated Extraneous Offenses Not Admissible at the
Punishment Phase of a Trial Under Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Article 37.07, Section 3
Grunsfeld v. State2 11 involved the Texas Legislature's 1989 amendment to
Article 37.07, section 3(a), 2 12 allowing the admission at the punishment
phase of the trial of any evidence the trial court deemed relevant to sentenc-
ing, in addition to evidence of prior criminal record, general reputation and
character that were already admissible under the statute. The trial court in
Grunsfeld 21 3 admitted, at the punishment phase, testimony from witnesses
that the defendants had committed the same sexual offenses against them as
the defendants were charged with, even though there were no charges filed.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that "evidence is not admissible at
punishment, unless (1) it is permitted by the Texas Rules of Criminal Evi-
dence, and (2) if the evidence sought to be admitted is evidence of an extra-
neous offense, it satisfies Article 37.07, section 3(a)'s definition of prior
criminal record. ' 2 14 The court interpreted the 1989 amendment to continue
the prohibition against admission of non-final or unadjudicated extraneous
charges of criminal conduct at the punishment phase of a non-capital of-
fense.2 15 Therefore, the court held that the trial courts abused their discre-
tion in admitting evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses under
Article 37.07, section 3(a), and reversed the decision of the trial courts. 2 16
h. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 404(B)
i. Admissibility of "Background Evidence:" Res Gestae Offenses
In Rogers v. State217 the Court of Criminal Appeals had the opportunity
to apply the two-part test for determining the admissibility of background
evidence, formerly known as the doctrine of res gestae. The first question
addressed is whether the background evidence is relevant under Texas Rule
of Criminal Evidence 401. If relevant, the next issue is whether the back-
ground evidence should be "admitted as an 'exception' under Rule
404(b). ' 2 18 After finding that marijuana seized during a search of the de-
210. Id.
211. 843 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
212. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon 1989).
213. Grunsfeld was actually a consolidation of two cases that sought review of the same
issue, and were factually indistinguishable on this issue.
214. Grunsfeld, 843 S.W.2d at 523.
215. Id. at 526.
216. Id. The decision set forth in Grunsfeld has been overruled by the legislature. Article
37.07, § 3(a) has been amended yet again, and now allows the admission of "evidence of an
extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been
committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of
whether he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act..." TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37,07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
217. 853 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
218. Id. (quoting Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see TEX. R.
CRIM. EvID. 404(b) (making admissible evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes
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fendant's home was relevant, the court reviewed the trial court's determina-
tion that the evidence was admissible as an exception under Rule 404(b). 2 19
The court first had to distinguish between two types of background evidence:
(1) evidence of other offenses connected with the primary offense, referred to
as "same transaction evidence" and (2) general background evidence, re-
ferred to as "background contextual evidence."' 220 Here, the court stated
that the marijuana evidence was "same transaction evidence" since it oc-
curred during a lawful arrest of the defendant and search of his home.221
Necessity is the reason for admitting evidence of the accused's acts, words
and conduct at the time of the offense in "same transaction contextual evi-
dence" situations. Only if the facts and circumstances of the primary offense
would make little or no sense without bringing in such background evidence
should the evidence be admitted. 222 In this case, it was possible for the pri-
mary offense to be narrated without mentioning the marijuana that was
found or the description of the marijuana in the defendant's confession.
Therefore, it was not necessary to admit the evidence. 223
ii. Notice Requests and Compliance
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 404(b) also states that if the State in-
tends to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, the defendant is
entitled to reasonable notice in advance of trial of such intent, ifthe accused
timely requests. 224 In Espinosa v. State225 the State offered and the trial
judge admitted evidence of extraneous offenses despite a request by the de-
fendant for notice of such intent. The request was contained in a motion for
discovery filed with the trial court, and there was no mention of Rule 404(b).
The record failed to show if the trial court ever ruled on the motion. The
Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Rule 404(b) requires that the
request by the accused be in writing and served on the State, in order to
notify the State that the defendant is requesting notice pursuant to Rule
404(b). 226 The court held that a request in a motion filed with the trial judge
is not sufficient without a subsequent order by the judge to the State to pro-
vide such notice. 227 Consequently, the trial court properly admitted the evi-
dence because the State was under no obligation to provide the defendant
with notice. 228
other than to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith).
219. Rogers, 853 S.W.2d at 32.
220. Id. at 33.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 34.
224. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 404(b).
225. 853 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
226. Id. at 38.




i. Production of Statements of Witnesses After Testifying - Scope of
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 614
The scope and application of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 614229 was
interpreted for the first time in Jenkins v. State.230 A witness for the prose-
cution testified about drug importation into the Texas Department of Cor-
rections and admitted on cross-examination that he made reports of his
investigations. The defendant requested to see those reports pursuant to
Rule 614 but the request was denied. Material subject to Rule 614 must
"relate[ ] to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testi-
fied."' 23 1 The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that although the reports
sought described offenses which did not involve the defendant, the reports
were nevertheless discoverable. 232 The court also ruled that the reports were
discoverable even though they were incredibly voluminous as Rule 614 does
not exclude production of materials that are or might be voluminous.233
The court stated that Rule 614 is extremely broad and is to be interpreted to
compel production of "any statement ... that relates to the subject matter
concerning which the witness has testified." '234 The court also found that the
meaning of "statements" within Rule 614 includes reports written by a testi-
fying witness, and further found that "possession" encompasses material
that is within the witness' control or is readily available to the witness.2 35
The State's witness's reports should have been produced to the defendant.
j. Autopsy Reports and Their Admissibility Under Texas Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(B)
Under Article 49.25, section 1 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
any Texas county with a population of more than one million must have a
medical examiner. 236 When a medical examiner performs an autopsy, Arti-
cle 49.25, section 11 requires that full and complete records be kept, and
such records "shall be public records. '237 Public records are excluded from
the hearsay rule by Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B) if they are from a
public office or agency and they set forth matters the office has a duty to
report, unless they are made by law enforcement personnel in a criminal
proceeding. 238 The question in Garcia v. State239 was whether a county
medical examiner is law enforcement personnel, thereby excluding autopsy
reports from the hearsay exclusion in Rule 803(8)(B). The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals concluded that autopsy reports are prepared by officials with no
229. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 614 (outlining the scope and procedure for the production of
statements of a testifying witness other than the defendant).
230. No. 71,040, 1993 WL 138800 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 1993).
231. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 614(a).
232. Jenkins, 1993 WL 138800 at *4.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *5.
235. Id. at *5-6.
236. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 49.25, § I (Vernon 1989).
237. Id. art. 49.25, § 11.
238. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 803(8)(B).
239. No. 1095-92, 1993 WL 366511 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 1993).
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motive to fabricate the results of the reports, and further that the prosecu-
tion is not involved in the medical examiner's investigation or the prepara-
tion of the report.240 As a result, the court ruled that medical examiners are
not law enforcement personnel under Rule 803(8)(B) and that their autopsy
reports and death certificates are admissible. 24 1
3. Jury Instructions: Mere Presence - When Is It Required?
If the evidence raises the issue of mere presence, then on request that
charge must be given. 2 4 2 Mere presence alone of a defendant at the scene of
a crime does not render one a party to an offense. 2 43 In addition, mere pres-
ence alone is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony. 244 In Golden
v. State,245 a case involving a conspiracy to possess cocaine, the defendant
testified that he knew nothing about the plan to purchase the cocaine. The
Court of Criminal Appeals stated that this testimony alone was sufficient to
raise the issue of mere presence, and therefore a requested charge on mere
presence being insufficient to corroborate the accomplice witness's testimony
should have been given. 24 6
4. Jury Questions
a. Not Allowed During Trial
The Court of Criminal Appeals considered the practice of allowing jurors
to question witnesses by means of submitting written questions to the court
for the first time in Morrison v. State.247 The court agreed with the defend-
ant that such a practice amounts to a form of communication between jurors
and the parties, which calls into question the integrity of the adversary sys-
tem.24 8 The court also held that the dangers inherent in such a practice
could not be adequately circumvented by the imposition of procedural safe-
guards. 249 The court cited a concern for juror impartiality as a basis for
disallowing this practice. 250 The court also stated that this error was not
subject to a harm analysis z.2 5
b. Jury Questions During Deliberations and How to Answer
A judge's substantive response to a jury question during deliberations was
held to be an additional or supplemental jury instruction that was governed
by Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure25 2 in Daniell v.
240. Id. at *3-4.
241. Id. at *4.
242. Golden v. State, 851 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 851 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
246. Id. at 295.
247. 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
248. Id. at 884.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 887.
251. Id. at 889.
252. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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State.253 The jury sent out a question during deliberations asking whether
there were any local correctional facilities available, as the jury charge au-
thorized a punishment including confinement in "a community correctional
facility." Despite an objection by the defendant that included a suggestion
that the jury be told not to consider or discuss particular facilities, the judge
answered the jury's question. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Arti-
cle 36.14 only authorizes instructions to the jury on legal, not factual mat-
ters. 25 4 The court said that whether there were any correctional facilities in
the area was a factual matter about which the jury should not have received
an instruction. 255
5. Specific Crimes and Specialty Law
a. DWI: When Jury Can Recommend Driver's License Not Be
Revoked
Hernandez v. State256 held that a defendant convicted of driving while
intoxicated can ask that the jury recommend that his driver's license not be
suspended, even if the defendant does not have a license.257 Article 42.12 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows the trial court to instruct a
jury that they may recommend that a defendant's driver's license not be
suspended. 258 The Court of Criminal Appeals cited Texas Revised Civil
Statues Article 6687b, section 4A and Article 6687b,2 9 section 22, which
govern suspensions of driver's licenses, for the rule that one whose license is
suspended may not be issued a license during the period of suspension.260
The court said that because there is no requirement that a defendant have a
valid driver's license before the Department of Public Safety can suspend
driving privileges, the defendant need not have a valid license before he can
ask the jury to recommend that his license not be suspended. 261
b. Kidnapping - Safe vs. Unsafe Place - Who Has Burden of
Proof?
In Williams v. State262 the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the ques-
tion of which party bears the burden of proof on whether a kidnapper re-
leased his victim alive and in a safe place.263 Under section 20.04(b) of the
Texas Penal Code,264 aggravated kidnapping is a second degree felony if the
accused leaves the victim alive and in a safe place. The court split the bur-
253. 848 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
254. Id. at 147.
255. Id.
256. 842 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
257. Id. at 296.
258. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 13(g) (Vernon 1989).
259. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 4A (Vernon 1987); Id. § 22.
260. Hernandez, 842 S.W.2d at 296.
261. Id.
262. 851 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
263. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(b) (Vernon 1974) (stating the felony degree of




den of proof into two components: the burden of production and the burden
of persuasion. 265 The court construed section 20.04(b) to be the equivalent
of a legal defense, and thus placed the burden of production on the de-
fense.2 6 6 If no evidence from either party can support a finding of a safe
place, the accused is punished as a first degree felon.2 6 7 However, if the issue
is raised by some evidence, and the burden of production is met, the prosecu-
tion has the burden of persuasion to convince the trier of fact that the place
where the victim was released was not safe.2 6 8
Note that the legislature has made several significant changes to the Texas
Penal Code that affect the decision in Williams. Effective September 1, 1994,
the voluntary release of a victim in a safe place will be a punishment issue
that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 269
c. Murder - The Need to Produce a Body
The corpus delicti rule was examined in Fisher v. State.270 The corpus
delicti of a crime simply consists of the fact that the crime in question has
been committed by someone. 27 1 The Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed
their holdings that "the corpus delicti of murder is established if the evi-
dence shows (a) the death of a human being (b) caused by the criminal act of
another." 272 Article 1204 of the 1925 Penal Code required the production
and identification of the body or remains of the deceased in all murder prose-
cutions.273 The fight in Fisher concerned whether Article 1204 had been
repealed by the legislature in 1974. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled
that the legislature had in fact expressly repealed Article 1204, and that a
body was not required to be produced as a prerequisite to a conviction in a
murder prosecution. 274
6. Punishment
a. Court Cannot Order Incarceration or Electronic Monitoring in
Deferred Adjudication Probation
Two sections of Article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
came into question in Ex parte Gingell.275 Article 42.12, section 5276 gov-
erns the area of deferred adjudication probation, and Article 42.12, section
21(a)2 7 7 provides for electronic monitoring in lieu of incarceration in the
county jail or state penitentiary. The Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated
265. Williams, 851 S.W.2d at 285.
266. Id. at 286.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
270. 851 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
271. Id. at 303.
272. Id.
273. Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1204 (Vernon 1925).
274. Fisher, 851 S.W.2d at 303.
275. 842 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
276. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
277. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(a) (Vernon 1989).
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the rule that incarceration is an unreasonable condition of deferred adjudica-
tion probation. 278 Since electronic monitoring is only allowed in lieu of in-
carceration, and incarceration was not allowed in this situation, the court
held that the trial court could not impose electronic monitoring as a condi-
tion of probation. 279 The trial court's orders were reformed to delete elec-
tronic monitoring as a condition of the defendant's deferred adjudication
probation. 280
b. Defendant's Absolute Right to a Punishment Hearing
The trial judge in Borders v. State281 simultaneously made a finding of
guilt and assessed punishment. The defendant did not object at the hearing
but instead complained that this was error in a motion for new trial. The
Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed an earlier decision 28 2 in stating that it
is sufficient to preserve this error by raising it for the first time in a motion
for new trial. 283 The court stated that Article 42.12, section 5(b) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 284 entitles a defendant to a punishment
hearing after the adjudication of guilt, and that Article 37.07, section 3285
requires that the trial court afford the defendant the opportunity to present
punishment evidence after the finding of guilt.286 The court held that de-
spite his failure to object at trial, the defendant preserved the error by raising
an objection in a timely filed motion for new trial, and the court remanded
for a sentencing hearing. 287
c. Deferred Adjudication Allowed for Felonies with More Than Ten
Years
The question in Cabezas v. State288 was whether a defendant may receive
deferred adjudication probation when the minimum term for the punish-
ment of the crime is greater than ten years. The trial court wanted to give
the defendant deferred adjudication but was persuaded by the State that de-
ferred adjudication was unavailable because the minimum sentence exceeded
ten years. The Court of Criminal Appeals cited Article 42.12, section 3 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 289 and held that nothing in that sec-
tion limits the eligibility of deferred adjudication where the minimum sen-
tence is greater than ten years.290 The court said that the trial court and
278. Gingell, 842 S.W.2d at 285.
279. Id.
280. Id. The legislature has since repealed the statutory language relied upon by the court
in Gingell and amended TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 42.12 to allow electronic monitoring
to be imposed as a condition of probation, including deferred adjudication.
281. 846 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
282. See Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
283. Borders, 846 S.W.2d at 835.
284. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon 1989).
285. Id. art. 37.07, § 3.
286. Borders, 846 S.W.2d at 835-36.
287. Id.
288. 848 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
289. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (Vernon 1989).
290. Cabezas, 848 S.W.2d at 695.
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other courts were confused by Article 42.12, section 3,291 which mandates
that deferred adjudication probation be no greater than ten years. 292 How-
ever, certain offenses are excluded from consideration for deferred adjudica-
tion under Article 42.12, section 5(d). 29 3
C. POST-TRIAL AND APPEAL AREAS
In these areas, the Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed the exact
moment when the thirty-day period for a notice of appeal begins, the effect
of a defendant's withdrawal of a plea on the State, the definition of a district
attorney for purposes of a notice of appeal, and the scope of the rule stating
permissible grounds for a new trial. The court has also decided cases regard-
ing the propriety of consecutive sentences, the meaning of "dual" representa-
tion, and the presumption that a trial judge disregarded inadmissible
evidence. The court has considered whether a hearing is mandatory after a
defendant files a motion for a new trial, how specific a defendant's motion
for new trial must be, and what must be in evidence at a revocation hearing.
Additionally, the court has examined who may compute a defendant's back
time, the scope of the trial court's authority to order reimbursement from a
suddenly non-indigent defendant, and the power of the court of appeals to
reform a judgment.
1. Notice of Appeal
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b)(1) indicates that an appeal is
perfected when notice of appeal is given within thirty days after sentencing
in open court or after an appealable order is signed. 294 In Rodarte v. State295
the defendant argued that a notice of appeal from a judgment of conviction
is timely if filed within thirty days from when the trial court signs the judg-
ment. 296 The Court of Criminal Appeals said that such an interpretation of
Rule 41(b)(1) effectively reads the phrase "the day the sentence is imposed
or suspended in open court" out of the rule. 297 The court held that which
starting point is used in calculating the timeliness of the notice of appeal
depends upon what is being appealed. 298 For a defendant who appeals a
judgment of conviction, the thirty days begin to run on the day sentence is
imposed or suspended in open court. 299 In other appealable criminal cases,
"the timetable for notice of appeal begins on the day of the signing of the
appealable order ....
291. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3 (Vernon 1989).
292. Cabezas, 848 S.W.2d at 695.
293. Id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(d) (Vernon 1989).
294. TEX. R. App. P. 41(b)(1).
295. 860 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
296. Id. at 109.
297. Id.
298. Id.




2. State's Right to Appeal
a. Allowing a Withdrawal of Plea Can Equal Granting a "New Trial"
Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, governing the
State's right to appeal, provides that the State, through the prosecuting at-
torney, may appeal criminal cases in certain situations.30 One such situa-
tion is when the trial court grants a new trial. 30 2 The Court of Criminal
Appeals stated in Evans v. State30 3 that Article 44.01 allows the State to
appeal not just orders that mirror the language of the Article, but also orders
that have the same effect as the orders enumerated. 3° 4 The trial court ac-
cepted the defendant's plea bargain and sentenced him. However, the trial
court then granted the defendant's "Motion To Withdraw Plea." When the
State appealed, the defendant challenged the State's right to appeal. The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the order granting the "Motion To
Withdraw Plea" effectively granted the defendant a new trial, and that the
State had the right to appeal the judgment. 30 5
The Court of Criminal Appeals found support for the holding in Evans in
two prior decisions. In State v. Moreno30 6 the court ruled that an order
granting a motion to quash effectively is an order dismissing the indictment,
and that it is affected by Article 44.01(1). 30 7 In State v. Young 30 the court
held that an order granting a writ of habeas corpus was also an order dis-
missing the indictment, subject to Article 44.01.309
b. Notice by D.A. Pro-Tem AKA Special Prosecutor
The authority of a "special prosecutor" to appeal came into question in
State v. Rosenbaum.310 The district attorney had been disqualified from the
case by the trial judge, who appointed a special prosecutor to investigate and
prosecute the case. After a motion to quash was granted, the special prose-
cutor timely filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals had
previously ruled that Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure3 1 did not allow the elected district attorney's subordinate to make an
appeal. 3 12 The Rosenbaum court distinguished this case on that point; how-
ever, on the grounds that this special prosecutor was actually an attorney pro
301. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.' ANN. art. 44.01 (a-d) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The Article
does not specifically provide that the prosecuting attorney may appeal, but rather states that
"the state" may appeal, however, it also specifically refers to the prosecuting attorney in im-
posing the fifteen day time period for filing. Id. Therefore, the state and prosecuting attorney
are interchangeable terms for the purpose of this Article.
302. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(3) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
303. 843 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
304. Id. at 577.
305. Id. at 578.
306. 807 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
307. Id. at 333-34; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
308. 810 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
309. Id. at 223.
310. 852 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
311. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
312. State v. Muller, 829 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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tern31 3 who therefore substituted for the district attorney.314 The court
stated that an attorney pro tern takes the place of the elected district attorney
for purposes of giving notice of an appeal.315
3. Grounds for a New Trial
In Evans v. State316 the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered
whether Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(b) was an exclusive list of
grounds for a motion for a new trial.317 The court concluded that the list in
Rule 30(b) was merely illustrative and not exhaustive. 318 The court rea-
soned that the predecessor to Rule 30(b) included the language "and no
other" in the list of reasons a new trial shall be granted. 319 The court further
stated that trial judges have the discretion to consider matters not enumer-
ated in the statute when passing on a motion for new trial. 320 Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the defendant's motion for
new trial. 321
Recently, the legislature passed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article
40.001,322 which requires material evidence of innocence, and not just any
evidence of innocence, to obtain a new trial. This rule effectively overrides
Rule 30(b)(6), which allowed a new trial for newly discovered evidence. 323
4. Consecutive Sentences
Section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code requires that a defendant who is
found guilty of multiple crimes receive concurrent sentences if: (1) the of-
fenses arise out of the same criminal episode; and (2) are prosecuted in a
single criminal action.3 24 Both of these requirements must be met. In
Duran v. State325 the trial court revoked the defendant's probation as to two
offenses and ordered that his two sentences run consecutively. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the defendant had the burden to show that both
requirements were met, and there was no evidence in the record to show that
the proceeding was a single criminal action. 326 In an earlier case, the court
had held that a single criminal action is a proceeding by which a person
313. A district attorney pro tern is a lawyer appointed by a district judge who takes an oath
to assume the duties of the elected district attorney. A special prosecutor is a lawyer permitted




316. 843 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
317. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b) (stating that a new trial shall be granted, for one of nine enu-
merated grounds).
318. Evans, 843 S.W.2d at 578.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 578-79.
321. Id. at 578.
322. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
323. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b)(6).
324. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
325. 844 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
326. Id. at 746.
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charged with a crime is either found guilty or not guilty and sentenced. 327
In Duran, one judge explained that by placing the defendant on probation,
imposition of the sentence was suspended and thus the proceeding did not
meet the definition of a criminal action. 328
5. Self-Representation on Appeal
In Hathorne v. State329 the defendant wanted to represent himself on ap-
peal. The trial court appointed an appellate lawyer to assist the defendant.
The defendant objected to the appointment of an attorney. The Court of
Criminal Appeals recognized the right of a defendant to proceed pro se with-
out the aid of counsel. 330 The court approved of the appellate hybrid repre-
sentation that the defendant received, stating that such a decision is within
the discretion of the trial court. 33' The court believed that hybrid represen-
tation on appeal, as was done in this case, does not deny a defendant his
right to self-representation as long as he is allowed to view the record and file
a brief on his own behalf.332 One concern with hybrid representation arises
when there is a conflict inherent in the arguments presented by the defend-
ant and those presented by the appointed counsel. The court held that ap-
pellate courts must give full and adequate consideration to the points of
error raised by both appointed counsel and by the defendant in his pro se
brief.333
6. Appellate Presumptions
Under Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, every
judgment shall be reversed where the appellate court finds error in the pro-
ceedings below, unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.3 34
The Court of Criminal Appeals decided in Gipson v. State335 that this rule
voided the long-standing doctrine of conditional presumption. 336 According
to this doctrine, in a trial before a judge, where there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the judgment was based on inadmissible evidence that was
mistakenly admitted, it will be presumed that the trial judge disregarded the
inadmissible evidence. 337 The promulgation of Rule 81(b)(2) has implicitly
overruled the presumption test, and errors in the trial court are analyzed the
same whether the trial is before a judge or a jury. 338
327. See LaPorte v. State, 840 S:W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
328. Duran, 844 S.W.2d at 747 (Baird, J. concurring).
329. 848 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
330. Id. at 122-23.
331. Id. at 123.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 123-24.
334. TEX. R. APP. P. 81(b)(2).
335. 844 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).





7. Motion for New Trial
a. Hearing - When Mandatory
In Reyes v. State339 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial judge
must hold a hearing on a motion for a new trial when the defendant raises
matters not determinable from the record upon which he could be entitled to
relief.34° The defendant raised ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion
for a new trial, supported by an affidavit pursuant to Texas Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 31.341 The court held that a hearing on a motion for a new
trial is not required when the matters raised in the motion are determinable
from the record. 342 Alternatively, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial judge
not to hold a Rule 31(d) hearing on a motion for a new trial that raises
matters which are not determinable from the record. 343 The court con-
cluded that the trial judge had abused his discretion as the defendant's mo-
tion for new trial did raise a matter not determinable from the record, upon
which he could be entitled to relief.344
b. Specificity Required in a Defendant's Motion for New Trial
The list of reasons for granting a motion for new trial in Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 30(b) are illustrative and not exclusive. 345 In State v.
Gonzalez346 the defendant was permitted to seek a new trial in the interest of
justice, a reason not enumerated in Rule 30(b). The State objected that the
defendant had failed to allege a factual basis in his motion and failed to offer
proof supporting his claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a de-
fendant must allege sufficient grounds to apprise the trial judge and the State
why a new trial is warranted. 347 The court found that the defendant alleged
a sufficient factual basis for a new trial in requesting to present favorable
witnesses that were not presented at the time of sentencing.3 48
The court also raised the issue of the standard of appellate review. The
court reaffirmed consistent case law that says that a decision on a motion for
new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will only be
reversed on a showing of abuse of discretion.3 49 The appealing party has the
burden of demonstrating that the trial judge abused his discretion.350
339. 849 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
340. Id. at 815.
341. TEX. R. App. P. 31.
342. Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Evans v. State, 843 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
346. 855 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
347. Id. at 694-95.
348. Id. at 695.






The question in Cobb v. State35' was whether formal proof was necessary
in a probation revocation hearing to establish the terms and conditions of
probation. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that a probation revoca-
tion hearing is an administrative hearing, not a criminal or civil trial.352 The
State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant vio-
lated the terms of his probation. 353 The Court found that the State had
failed to adequately prove the terms of this defendant's probation. 354 The
court held that formal proof is not necessary to establish the terms and con-
ditions of probation, and that the trial court does not need to judicially no-
tice nor must the State prove the conviction and terms of probation, as long
as the judgment and order of probation appear in the appellate record.3 55
However, the State still must prove the identity of the probationer, and that
the probationer violated the terms of the order of probation. 356
b. Specificity Necessary When Ordering Community Service
Texas trial courts find authority to require community service as a condi-
tion of probation in Article 42.12, sections 1 I(a)(10) and 17(a) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.357 Under section 1 1(a)(10), the community
service work program is to be "designated by the court. ' 358 Section 17(a)
requires that the community service project or organization be "named in
the court's order." 359 In Lemon v. State36° the Court of Criminal Appeals
considered a condition of probation imposing 600 hours of community ser-
vice as directed by the Adult Probation Officer. The court recognized that
section 10(d) of Article 42.12 allows a probation officer to modify a proba-
tion order, but only when authorized by the trial court. 36' However, section
10(a) states that it remains the responsibility of the trial court in the first
instance to impose the conditions of probation.3 62 Given this, the court con-
cluded that the law has been and remains that when community service is
ordered, the trial judge must designate a specific community service pro-
ject.363 Thus, the order by the trial judge imposing conditions of probation
violated Article 42.12.364
351. 851 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
352. Id. at 873.
353. Id. at 874.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 873.
356. Id. at 874.
357. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ I 1(a)(10), 17(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
358. Id. art. 42.12, § 11(a)(10).
359. Id. art. 42.12, § 17(a).
360. 861 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
361. Id. at 251.
362. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 10(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
363. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d at 251.
364. Id. at 252.
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9. Computation of Back Time
In Ex parte Harvey 365 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that when a
trial judge awards back time credit for pre-sentence time served in jail, the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, may not re-
quire that the trial judge specify why the defendant is entitled to such
credit. 366 Computing the amount of back time due to a defendant for pre-
sentence confinement is solely the responsibility of the trial court, under
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.03, Sections 2(a), 3 and 4.367
No requirement exists that the trial court detail the reasons for the award
provided that such credit does not exceed the time between the date of com-
mission of the offense and the imposition of the sentence.368
10. Reimbursement of Court Appointed Attorney's Fees
A defendant whose trial is conducted by a state-appointed attorney may
be required to repay the county for the court-appointed attorney's fees pur-
suant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.05(e). 369 In Curry v. Wil-
son 370 the defendant claimed that after the judgment of acquittal had been
entered, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to order him to repay the
legal fees. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court does not
lose jurisdiction until all of the issues which arise as a result of the initial
action have been resolved. 37 1 The court found support for this jurisdiction
in Article 26.05(e), stating that the Article gives the trial court continuing
authority to order repayment of the county funds expended for the defend-
ant's counsel. 372
11. Reformation of Judgments
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 80, the court of appeals may
modify the judgment of the court below by correcting or reforming it. 373 In
Bigley v. State3 74 the court of appeals found there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding of guilt of the charged crime, but that the evidence was
sufficient to support a lesser included offense.375 Consequently, the court of
appeals reformed the judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser included
offense. 376 The Court of Criminal Appeals, while recognizing that Rule 80
365. 846 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
366. Id. at 329.
367. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03, §§ 2(a), 3, and 4 (Vernon 1989).
368. Id.
369. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.05(e) (Vernon 1989) (stating that if a trial
court finds that a defendant who had been provided appointed legal counsel at the expense of
the county has the financial resources to offset the costs of his defense, the judge shall order
him to repay the county).
370. 853 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
371. Id. at 44.
372. Id. at 45.
373. TEX. R. App. P. 80.
374. No. 939-92, 1993 WL 205004 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 1993).




does not permit it to modify a judgment, found that such a reformation was
within the power of the court of appeals. 377 The court refused to limit the
Rule 80 power of courts of appeals to reform judgments to only those situa-
tions involving mistakes of a clerical nature.3 78
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